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ABSTRACT
This paper constructs an evolutionary game model of team mem-
bers’ knowledge transfer behaviour with reciprocal preference in
team innovation activities, studies the strategy selection of team
members, and simulates the evolution equilibrium strategy of the
model with different parameter changes. The results show that the
proportion of initial reciprocal actors, the proportion of sharing, and
the degree of knowledge complementation are all conducive to the
formation of reciprocal cooperation of knowledge transfer, while
the work conflict is just the opposite. In addition, the influence of
reciprocal preference on evolutionary equilibrium is related to the
spreads in reciprocity and self-interested behaviour. This paper
extends the research on the reciprocal cooperation of knowledge
team from the perspective of behavioural economics.
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Knowledge is the foundation of innovation. Knowledge flow is the driving force of
team innovation activities. It plays a key role in promoting organisational learning,
gathering individual knowledge of employees into organisational knowledge to establish
and enhance organisational competitive advantage (Nonaka, 1994). ‘Open innovation’
proposed by Chesbrough (2011), is to absorb the internal and external diversity of
knowledge actively in the process of innovation (Chesbrough, 2011). The integration of
diversified and heterogeneous knowledge has a significant positive impact on improving
team innovation performance. Polanyi divided knowledge into explicit knowledge and
tacit knowledge, and considered that tacit knowledge is the subject of knowledge with
characteristics of non-coding and monopoly. Therefore, for the knowledge output,
knowledge transfer to knowledge acquirers is a self-sacrifice (labour but may not be
rewarded) activities, individual always have the enthusiasm to become a knowledge
acquirer rather than a knowledge writer. At the same time, because of the individual or
the organisational control and security needs, the lack of mutual trust, the loss of
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knowledge power and other reasons, the transfer of knowledge is not smooth, which
hindered the activities of innovation to some extent (Weidong & Hong, 2014).
The material incentive can effectively promote the knowledge sharing among team
members, but the role of informal contract cannot be ignored. Public goods games
found that reciprocity theory can explain the existence of significant public goods sup-
ply in part (Yean & Zifeng, 2008). Traditional economics assumes that human is
rational and self-interest, but many examples in life cannot be explained by pure self-
interest, such as people’s voluntary contributions, sacrificing self-interests to punish
others. In knowledge transfer, we can often see that some people are willing to sacrifice
their time and energy to teach others even if there is no direct return, some people pre-
fer to give up the extra benefits brought by cooperation, and do not want to share
knowledge with colleagues. Reciprocal preferences play a role in this. Reciprocal prefer-
ence means that people often respond to others’ intentions or motive a certain behav-
iour. When he feels that others are full of goodwill to himself, he will also return to
them in good faith; when he feels that others are malicious to himself, then he will also
give them a malicious return, even if this action requires a certain price. So the know-
ledge transfer behaviours in teams’ innovation activities are also affected by individual
reciprocity preferences. In recent years, with the rise of behavioural economics, research
on reciprocity and knowledge sharing or knowledge transfer has gradually increased,
and concentrated in the following aspects: Reciprocity has a significant positive impact
on knowledge sharing, knowledge acquisition and knowledge contribution (Haixin &
Renjing, 2014; Hejiang, 2014; Weidong & Hong, 2014); reciprocal norms have a signifi-
cant positive impact on knowledge sharing, knowledge contribution and knowledge
search behaviour (Changping & Li, 2015; Zhimin, Jiangle, & Yiping, 2014); reciprocal
preference can effectively promote the transformation of tacit knowledge within the R
& D team and further improve the team technological innovation capacity (Tongjian,
2010; Tongjian & Yongjian, 2010). In terms of the choice of reciprocal behaviour, some
scholars believe that risk appetite affects the choice of reciprocal behaviour (Guo, Ershi,
& Liang, 2015), but this behaviour should also be affected by the reciprocity preferences
of the actors themselves (Chunchun, Congying, & Ye-An, 2015).
In the team innovation activities, whether it is knowledge sharing, knowledge con-
tribution or knowledge search, its essence is to achieve the transfer of knowledge.
This cooperative and mutually beneficial behaviour–knowledge transfer, is closely
related to the individual bounded rationality of the reciprocity preferences. Therefore,
there is a certain deviation if the traditional game theory based on complete rational
hypothesis is used to study the behaviour. At the same time in the team innovation
activities, the collision of knowledge is not a one-time, but continues to occur repeat-
edly between the different individuals, and the optimal strategy is gradually being
adopted by more and more individuals in this process. So It is more realistic and the-
oretical using evolutionary game theory to analyze knowledge transfer behaviour of
bounded rational participants.
Therefore, based on the preference of individual reciprocity, this paper analyzes
the evolution of knowledge transfer among members in team innovation activities,
and provides a reference for knowledge-based enterprises or teams to promote know-
ledge accumulation and creation and improve innovation efficiency.
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2. Model
2.1. Hypotheses
H1: There are N members with bounded rationality in a knowledge team to carry out
innovative activities. The members have heterogeneous knowledge and reciprocity
preferences.
H2: Efforts by any team member include individual work efforts xiand knowledge




2 þ Kxiyi; with C0>0;C00>0; while xi  0; yi  0; and K 2 ð0½elinters1Þ is the
conflict coefficient between individual work efforts and knowledge transfer efforts.
When K ¼ 0; there is no conflict between the two efforts, and when K ¼ 1; there is a
complete conflict between the two efforts (Kretschmer & Puranam, 2008).
H3: The team members are randomly assigned to transfer knowledge, and the output of
team members pi is determined by individual work efforts and the knowledge transfer
efforts of the matching members. The knowledge transfer of other members to the team
member expands the knowledge width or depth of the member to a certain extent,
which is conducive to the improvement of personal output. We use the linear
relationship to describe the relationship between knowledge transfer effort and output,
which can effectively express the relationship and does not make the model too
complicated. The output function is pi ¼ xi þ lyj þ ei; while l shows the impact
coefficient of the matching member’s knowledge transfer on the output of the member,
that is, the degree of knowledge complementation. Without loss of generality, we
simplify the knowledge complementarity of members of the same team to the same level
and l  0: ei is an exogenous variable that is not controlled by team members, and has
a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a variance of r2: The exogenous random
factors faced by each member are equally distributed and independent.
H4: The total output of the team is the sum of the individual outputs of the team
members: p ¼ Pni¼1 pi: The team member’s salary income is xðpÞ ¼ aþ bp; where a is




H5: The strategy choice of the team members is uncertain, some members choose
reciprocity behaviour, that is, transfer knowledge to others, while the other part of the
members chooses self-interest behaviour, that is, do not transfer knowledge. But each
member is willing to accept the transfer of knowledge to improve innovation output.
2.2. Reciprocal preference effect (Rabin, 1993)
Rabin (1993) constructed a two-person game model with reciprocal intentions based
on the ‘psychological game theory‘ of Geanakoplos, Pearce and Satcchetti (1989),
namely the motivation fair model. He argued that the welfare implications of fairness
can be large, both because concern for fairness affects behaviour, and because it
changes a person’s utility for a given outcome. Rabin considered that people wish to
help those who are helping them, and hurt those who are hurting them. He defined a
‘kindness function’, which links the effectiveness of the participants to strategies that
others might implement. Rabin motivation fairness model portrays the influence of
reciprocal preferences from the perspective of utility, and provides a reference for the
study of participants’ strategic. Therefore, this paper uses the Rabin motivational fair
game model to correct the utility of players.
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Definition 1. Consider a two-player, normal-form game with (mixed) strategy sets Si
and Sj for players i and j, derived from finite pure-strategy sets Ai and Aj: Let pi :
Si  Sj ! R be player i’s material payoffs. Throughout, we shall use the following
notation: ai 2 Si and aj 2 Sj represent the strategies chosen by the two players; bi 2 Si
and bj 2 Sj represent, respectively, player j’s beliefs about what strategy player 1 is
choosing, and player i’s beliefs about what strategy player j is choosing; ci 2 Si and
cj 2 Sj represent player i’s beliefs about what player j believes player i’s strategy is,
and player j’s beliefs about what player i believes player j’s strategy is.




If pmaxj ðbjÞpminj ðbjÞ ¼ 0; then fiðai; bjÞ ¼ 0: If player i thinks player j chooses
strategy bj; we account for pmaxj ðbjÞ as the highest income of player j in
QðbjÞ;
pminj ðbjÞ is the lowest possible income of player j in
QðbjÞ; pej ðbjÞ is the equal income
of player j, and is satisfied pej ðbjÞ ¼
pmaxj ðbjÞþpminj ðbjÞ
2 :
Definition 3: Player i’s belief about how kind player j is being to him is given





If pmaxi ðciÞpmini ðciÞ ¼ 0; then ~f jðbj; ciÞ ¼ 0: fiðÞ and ~f jðÞ 2 ½1; 1=2:
Definition 4: The pair of strategies ðai; ajÞ 2 ðSi; SjÞ is a Fairness Equilibrium,
then

ai 2 argmaxa2SiUiða; bj; ciÞ
ci ¼ bi ¼ ai :
That is, a group of strategies that give each other the best response to each other,
and the beliefs at all levels are consistent with the actual strategy choices.
Definition 5: Each player i maximise his expected which incorporates both his
material utility and the utility players’ shared notion of fairness:
Ui ai; bj; ci
  ¼ pi ai; bj þ c 	 ~f j ai; bj  	 1þ fi bj; ci  ; c  0 (1)
The reciprocal preference intensity coefficient c characterises the effect of the par-
ticipant’s reciprocity preference on its utility (Guodong & Yongjian, 2011). When c ¼
0; it is shown that the participant is purely self-interested, and the larger the c; the
greater the utility of the reciprocal motivator to the participant is relative to the
material utility.
3. Evolutionary game
3.1. The material benefits of players
In innovation activity, knowledge transfer is the process of players to share their own
knowledge with others. Team members have two strategies in innovation activities.
One is to cooperate with others and transfer knowledge to other members. We call it
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reciprocal behaviour, denoted by H. And another does not transfer knowledge to
others, but accept knowledge from others. We call it self-interested behaviour,
denoted by L. As Ei is player i’s expected utility.
Take the game of two people as an example. Randomly matching members i and j
randomly choose whether to carry out knowledge transfer to each other,
Ei½elintersH;H½elinters means that when i selects strategy H, j also selects strategy
H, the expected utility of player i without considering reciprocity preference.
EiH;H ¼ E x pð Þ  C xi; yið Þ
















Similarly, we can get the material benefit matrix of players i and j under different
strategies like formulas (2), as shown in Table 1.

















Ej½elintersH;H½elinters ¼ E x pð Þ  C xj; yjð Þ



















Ej H; Lð Þ ¼ aþ b xi þ xjð Þ þ lyi½ 
x2j
2








Table 1. Material Benefit Matrix.
H L
H aþ b½ðxi þ xjÞ þ lðyi þ yjÞ
 x2i2 
y2i
2 Kxiyi aþ b½ðxi þ xjÞ þ


























aþ bðxi þ xjÞ x
2
i
2 aþ bðxi þ xjÞ
x2j
2
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Ej L; Lð Þ ¼ aþ b xi þ xjð Þ
x2j
2
3.2. The benefits of players based on reciprocity preferences
The Rabin Motivational Equity Model is used to correct the expected utility of players
with reciprocal preferences. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the team players
are homogeneous and therefore x1 ¼ x2 ¼ x; y1 ¼ y2 ¼ y:
Both player i and player j select strategy H: According to the fair equilibrium
hypothesis, the belief at all levels is consistent with the actual strategy selection. The
player i thinks that the player j chooses the strategy H, then he can give the player j
the highest possible income is EjðH;HÞ ¼ aþ bð2xþ 2lyÞ x22  y
2
2 Kxy; the lowest
possible income is EjðH; LÞ ¼ aþ bð2x þ lyÞ x22  y
2
2 Kxy; the equal income is
EjðH;HÞþEjðH;LÞ
2 : Player i actually chooses strategy H, corresponding to the actual
income of player j is aþ bð2x þ 2lyÞ x22  y
2
2 Kxy: Player i’s kindness to player j is
fi H;Hð Þ ¼
pj H;Hð Þpej Hð Þ
pmaxj Hð Þ  pminj Hð Þ
¼ Ej H;Hð Þ Ej H;Hð Þ þ Ej H; Lð Þ
 
=2
Ej H;Hð Þ  Ej H; Lð Þ (3)
So how kindness does the player i think the player j to him?
When player i chooses strategy H, the highest possible income player j can give
player i is EiðH;HÞ ¼ aþ bð2x þ 2lyÞ x22  y
2
2 Kxy; the lowest possible income is
EiðH; LÞ ¼ aþ bð2x þ lyÞ x22  y
2
2 Kxy; the equal income is EiðH;HÞþEiðH;LÞ2 : Player j
actually chooses strategy H, corresponding to the actual income of player i. Player i’s
belief about how kind player j is being to him is:
~f j H;Hð Þ ¼
pi H;Hð Þpei Hð Þ
pmaxi Hð Þ  pmini Hð Þ
¼ Ei H;Hð Þ Ei H;Hð Þ þ Ei H; Lð Þð Þ=2
Ei H;Hð Þ  Ei H; Lð Þ (4)
According to formulas (1) and take (3), (4) into the utility function, simplify:
Ui H;Hð Þ ¼ Ei H;Hð Þ þ c 	 fj H;Hð Þ 	 1þ fi H;Hð Þ½ 
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We write a new benefit matrix based on reciprocal preferences for players, as
shown in Table 2.
3.3. Model solving
UH is the average utility of the player in the choice strategy H, UL is the average util-
ity of the player in the selection strategy L, U is the average utility of the total game
player, and s is the proportion of the player who contributes the knowledge transfer
behaviour to the whole group.



























































Take formulas (6) and (7) into average utility:
U ¼ sUH þ 1 sð ÞUL


















































Table 2. Benefit Matrix Based On Reciprocal Preferences.
H L
H aþ bð2x þ 2lyÞ x22  y
2
2 Kxyþ 34 c
aþ bð2x þ 2lyÞ x22  y
2
2 Kxyþ 34 c
aþ bð2x þ lyÞ x22  y
2
2 Kxy 34 c
aþ bð2x þ lyÞ x22 þ 14 c
L aþ bð2x þ lyÞ x22 þ 14 c
aþ bð2x þ lyÞ x22  y
2
2 Kxy 34 c
aþ bð2xÞ x22  14 c
aþ bð2xÞ x22  14 c
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The replication dynamic model can be obtained by using formulas (6) and (8):
F sð Þ ¼ s UH  Uð Þ
¼ s











































































Find the first derivative of FðsÞ :































A ¼ 3c blyþy22þKxyþ12cc
 2





















































1226 C. LIU AND X. LIU
4. Knowledge transfer behaviour evolution stability analysis
We mark DHHL for the spreads in reciprocity and self-interested behaviour when
the other party chooses the reciprocal behaviour, and DHHL for the spreads in reci-
procity and self-interested behaviour when the other party chooses self-interested
behaviour.












Obviously, DHHLDLHL ¼ c  0; equal to DHHL  DLHL:
Conclusion 1: When bly y22 Kxyþ 12 c<0; i.e.,DLHL  DHHL<0; the evolution of
the group will evolve into a stable strategy s1 ¼ 0; there will not exist knowledge
transfer behaviour in the team.
DLHL  DHHL<0 means that self-interested behaviour is dominance strategy.
When bly y22 Kxyþ 12 c<0 there is s2 ¼
blyþy22þKxyþ12c
c >1:So just consider two
points s1 ¼ 0 and s3 ¼ 1; there are:












So s1 ¼ 0 is the only evolutionary stabilisation strategy.
Conclusion 2: When bly y22 Kxy 12 c>0; i.e., DHHL  DLHL>0; the evolution of
the group will evolve into a stable strategy s3 ¼ 1; all team members choose to trans-
fer knowledge to others.
DHHL  DLHL>0 means that reciprocity behaviour is dominance strategy.
When bly y22 Kxy> 12 c; there is s2 ¼
blyþy22þKxyþ12c
c <0: So just consider two
points s1 ¼ 0 and s3 ¼ 1; there are:












So s3 ¼ 1 is the only evolutionary stabilisation strategy.
Conclusion 3: when  12 c  bly y
2
2 Kxy  12 c; i.e., DHHL  0 and DLHL  0; if
the proportion of initial reciprocal actorss0 is bigger than s2; the evolution of the
group will evolve into a stable strategy s3 ¼ 1; all team members choose to transfer
knowledge to others. Otherwise, the evolution of the group will evolve into a stable
strategy s1 ¼ 0; there will not exist knowledge transfer behaviour in the team.
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When  12 c  bly y
2
2 Kxy  12 c; s2 2 ½0; 1 there is






























So, s1 ¼ 0 and s3 ¼ 1 are two evolutionary stabilisation strategies. And s2 is a
threshold that changes the characteristics of the system evolution. If the proportion
of initial reciprocal actors is s2; the expected utility of reciprocal behaviour and self-
interest are the same. But this possible equilibrium is not a stable evolutionary equi-
librium. Because if there is a type of variation, the member who chooses the self-
interested behaviour instead chooses the reciprocal behaviour, which will directly lead
to the expected utility of reciprocal behaviour is greater than self-interested behav-
iour. Thus the proportion of reciprocal actors continues to increase, and finally the
self-interest has completely disappeared. So this equilibrium is unstable.
In this case, if only a small part of the team members (less than s2) in the game
select to transfer knowledge to others at the beginning, with innovation sustaining,
stable strategy game results will finally evolve to the members of the team refused to
transfer to his knowledge, that is, team spirit and the efficiency of knowledge innov-
ation the team will be seriously affected. But if a large part of the team members
(more than s2) in the game select to transfer knowledge to others at the beginning,
with innovation sustaining, stable strategy game results will finally evolve to all the
members will take the initiative to carry out knowledge transfer to others, that
is s3 ¼ 1:
The cause of these results is that members can not accurately grasp the game rev-
enue. They compared the result of the game with the team’s average income to deter-
mine the next action. When reciprocity members’ profits are below the average
income, they will choose self-interest in the next round. There will be no knowledge
transfer in the team. At the same time, the existence of reciprocal preferences exacer-
bated this behaviour, because their utility is compromised, that is the reciprocal mem-
bers did not get paid reciprocity in return. The ‘ingratitude‘ behaviour will hit the
enthusiasm of reciprocal behaviour, and refused to pay a mutual benefit to others.
On the contrary, if the reciprocity members’ profits are over the average income, they
will choose reciprocal behaviour in the next round. The result of evolution is that all
members actively transfer knowledge to others, and give full play to the team’s ability
to cooperate and innovate.
5. Simulation
We uses Matlab to simulate the evolution equilibrium strategy of the model with dif-
ferent parameter changes.
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5.1. Influence of the proportion of initial reciprocal actors s0
1. When bly y22 Kxyþ 12 c<0; i.e.,DLHL  DHHL<0; suppose c ¼ 1; b ¼ 0:1; l ¼
0:1; y ¼ 1;K ¼ 0:1; x ¼ 1: When the proportion of initial reciprocal actors in the
team is 0.2, 0.4, 0.7, 0.9 respectively, the simulation results are shown in
Figure 1. Regardless of the value of s0; as the number of steps in the evolutionary
iteration increases, fewer and fewer members choose reciprocal behaviour in the
team, and finally stabilise to 0. That is, no one is willing to transfer knowledge to
others, and there is no knowledge flow and sharing within the team. At the same
time, we can see that as s0 increases, more steps required to implement an evolu-
tionary stabilisation strategy s1 ¼ 0; the longer it takes.
2. when bly y22 Kxy 12 c>0; i.e.,DHHL  DLHL>0; suppose c ¼ 0:1;b ¼ 0:1; l ¼
0:1; y ¼ 1;K ¼ 0:1; x ¼ 1: When the proportion of initial reciprocal actors in the
team is 0.2, 0.4, 0.7, 0.9 respectively, the simulation results are shown in
Figure 2. Regardless of the value of s0; as the number of steps in the evolutionary
iteration increases, more and more members choose reciprocal behaviour in the
team, and finally stabilise to 1. That is, members are more willing to cooperate
with others on a reciprocal basis and share our own knowledge. At the same
time, we can see that as s0 increases, fewer steps required to implement an evolu-
tionary stabilisation strategy s3 ¼ 1; the shorter it takes.
3. when  12 c<bly y
2
2 Kxy< 12 c; i.e., DHHL>0 and DLHL<0; suppose c ¼ 1; b ¼
0:2; l ¼ 1; y ¼ 0:1;K ¼ 0:1; x ¼ 1: When the proportion of initial reciprocal
actors in the team is 0.2, 0.4, 0.7, 0.9 respectively, the simulation results are
shown in Figure 3. As so increases, evolutionary stable equilibrium changes from
s1 ¼ 0 to s3 ¼ 1: That means an increase of the proportion of initial reciprocal
actors contributes to the realisation of mutual benefit. At the same time, we can
see that as s0 increases, the more steps required to implement an evolutionary
stabilisation strategy s1 ¼ 0; the longer it takes, while fewer steps required to
implement an evolutionary stabilisation strategy s3 ¼ 1; the shorter it takes.
Figure 1. Simulation of s0 changes when D
L
HL  DHHL<0:
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In summary, no matter what the final evolutionary stability is, the bigger the propor-
tion of initial reciprocal actors is, the harder it is to achieve stable equilibrium s1 ¼ 0;
the easier it is to achieve stable equilibrium s3 ¼ 1:
5.2. Influence of the reciprocal preference intensity c
When c ¼ 0; DHL ¼ DHHL ¼ DLHL ¼ bly y
2
2 Kxy means the material spreads in
reciprocity and self-interested behaviour.
1. When DHL<0; c has a positive impact on the evolution results
First, the existence of c can make up for the spreads in the reciprocal income
Figure 2. Simulation of s0 changes when D
H
HL  DLHL>0:
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and the self-interested income, so that DHHL>0 may appear, avoiding the abso-
lute of evolution to s1 ¼ 0: Second, the bigger c is, the smaller s2 is
(@s2@c ¼
blyy22Kxy
c2 <0; when bly y
2
2 Kxy<0), and the easier stable equilibrium
s3 ¼ 1 can be achieved.
Suppose b ¼ 0:1; l ¼ 1; y ¼ 0:1;K ¼ 0:2; x ¼ 1; s0 ¼ 0:55; when the members’
reciprocal preference intensity c is 0, 0.5, 1, 3 respectively, the simulation results
are shown in Figure 4. As c increases, evolutionary stable equilibrium changes
from s1 ¼ 0 to s3 ¼ 1; and fewer steps required to implement an evolutionary
stabilisation strategy, the shorter it takes.
2. When DHL>0; c has a negative impact on the evolution results
First, the existence of c put forward higher requirements for spreads in reci-
procity and self-interested behaviour. Only when DLHL ¼ bly y
2
2 Kxy 12 c>0;
stable equilibrium s1 ¼ 0 will not appear. Second, the bigger c is, the bigger s2 is
(@s2@c ¼
blyy22Kxy
c2 >0; when bly y
2
2 Kxy>0), and the harder stable equilibrium
s3 ¼ 1 can be achieved.
Suppose b ¼ 0:2; l ¼ 1; y ¼ 0:1;K ¼ 0:1; x ¼ 1; s0 ¼ 0:45; when the members’
reciprocal preference intensity c is 0, 0.5, 1, 3 respectively, the simulation results
are shown in Figure 5. As c increases, evolutionary stable equilibrium changes
from s3 ¼ 1 to s1 ¼ 0; and fewer steps required to implement an evolutionary
stabilisation strategy, the shorter it takes.
5.3. Influence of other parameters
1. Influence of the proportion of sharing b
Suppose c ¼ 1; l ¼ 1; y ¼ 0:1;K ¼ 0:1; x ¼ 1; s0 ¼ 0:5; When the proportion of
sharing b is 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 respectively, the simulation results are shown in
Figure 6. As b increases, evolutionary stable equilibrium changes from s1 ¼ 0 to
Figure 4. Simulation of c changes when DHL<0:
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s3 ¼ 1: So we consider that b has a positive impact on the evolution results.
The reason for this is that as b increases, the total team output can increase the
income of the members more significantly, and increase spreads in reciprocity
and self-interested behaviour. Only when the reciprocal benefit is larger than the
self-interest benefit, the stable equilibrium s3 ¼ 1 is possible. Besides, the bigger b
is, the smaller s2 is (
@s2
@b ¼ lyc <0), and the easier stable equilibrium s3 ¼ 1 can
be achieved.
2. Influence of the degree of knowledge complementation l
Suppose c ¼ 1; b ¼ 0:2; y ¼ 0:1;K ¼ 0:1; x ¼ 1; s0 ¼ 0:5; when the degree of
knowledge complementation l is 0.1, 0.3, 0.6, 1 respectively, the simulation
Figure 5. Simulation of c changes when DHL>0:
Figure 6. Simulation of b changes.
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results are shown in Figure 7. As l increases, evolutionary stable equilibrium
changes from s1 ¼ 0 to s3 ¼ 1: So we consider that l has a positive impact on
the evolution results.
The reason for this is that as l increases, the contribution of knowledge transfer
behaviour to individual output and thus to the total output of the team becomes
greater, and increase spreads in reciprocity and self-interested behaviour. Only
when the reciprocal benefit is larger than the self-interest benefit, the stable equi-
librium s3 ¼ 1 is possible. Besides, the bigger l is, the smaller s2 is (@s2@l ¼ byc <0),
and the easier stable equilibrium s3 ¼ 1 can be achieved.
3. Influence of the work conflict K
Suppose c ¼ 1;b ¼ 0:2; l ¼ 1; y ¼ 0:1; x ¼ 1; s0 ¼ 0:5; when the conflict coeffi-
cient between individual work efforts and knowledge transfer efforts. K is 0.1,
0.2, 0.4, 0.5 respectively, the simulation results are shown in Figure 8. As K
increases, evolutionary stable equilibrium changes from s3 ¼ 1 to s1 ¼ 0:So we
consider that K has a positive impact on the evolution results.
As K increases, team members have to pay more for knowledge transfer to
others, spreads in reciprocity and self-interested behaviour reduce obviously. And
the bigger K is, the larger s2 is (
@s2
@K ¼ xyc >0), and the harder stable equilibrium
s3 ¼ 1 can be achieved.
6. Revelation
Based on the previous evolutionary game analysis and simulation results, we propose
the following suggestions on how to promote knowledge transfer behaviour to
improve team innovation performance.
1. According to the results of 5.1, the greater the proportion of initial reciprocal
actors s0; the more favourable to the realisation of the stable strategy of s3 ¼ 1;
Figure 7. Simulation of l changes.
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then in the daily management of the innovation team, some measures can be
taken to guide the reciprocal behaviour of team members. First, we can encour-
age members who actively exchange knowledge and help each other with other
people, such as issuing additional cooperation bonuses and awarding honorary
titles, etc., encouraging everyone to carry out extensive knowledge transfer and
achieve win-win cooperation; The two is to make use of people’s Constable
psychology, create a public opinion atmosphere of ‘most people will cooperate
with each other‘ within the team, and make some members who do not intend
to transfer knowledge to others, think that since most people are willing to do
this, they must have their reasons, and then follow most people to choose know-
ledge transfer; Third, to shape the mainstream values of the team that wins the
cooperation, because the mainstream values of the team will affect the behaviour
of each person in the team, which is why most successful companies attach great
importance to their corporate culture. When mainstream values are deeply rooted
in the hearts of the team members, more team members will actively choose
reciprocal behaviour.
2. According to the result of 5.2, the reciprocal preference of team members c is
variable to knowledge transfer behaviour. As a result, the team managers should
identify the reciprocal preferences of the members and select the most appropri-
ate members according to the benefits of the innovation activities. Specifically, if
the material benefits of team members’ reciprocal behaviour are lower than self-
interested behaviour, then members with strong reciprocal preferences should be
selected when establishing an innovation team, because in the case, the reciprocal
preference is helpful to realise Pareto optimality. If the material benefits of team
members’ reciprocal behaviour are higher than self-interested behaviour, then
members with weaker reciprocal preferences should be selected When establish-
ing an innovation team, because in this case, reciprocal preference is not helpful
to realise Pareto optimality.
Figure 8. Simulation of K changes.
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3. According to the results of 5.3, the increase of the proportion of the project out-
put （b） contributes to realising Pareto optimality, so the team manager can
consider increasing the proportion of members in a moderate range and making
them more sharing the benefits of collective output, but limited by the total out-
put and the number of team members, b can only be changed within a certain
range, and the promotion effect of Pareto optimality realisation has limitations.
The improvement of the knowledge complimentarily coefficient （l） also con-
tributes to the realisation of Pareto optimality. When establishing an innovation
team and selecting team members, we should fully consider the knowledge struc-
ture of team members, form a complementary and complete knowledge system,
and improve the efficiency of innovation. The conflict coefficient （K） between
knowledge transfer effort and work effort is not conducive to realising Pareto
optimality. Therefore, within the innovation team, smooth knowledge communi-
cation channels and an open knowledge innovation platform should be estab-
lished to reduce the resistance flow of knowledge within the team.
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